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Abstract 
 
This study examines in detail the development aid architecture in Kenya’s agriculture 
sector. The focus is on the mechanisms in place within the Kenyan government (and 
ministry of agriculture in particular), mechanisms among and within donor agencies, and 
overall coordination mechanisms that bring together the donors and the government. 
Findings show that coordination and harmonization activities among donors are yet to yield 
the desired outcomes such as the division of labor protocol and joint programming. 
Weaknesses are also observed on the government side where it appears authorities are yet 
to internalize PD concepts and interpret them to suit the country's needs. The author argues 
for the need to strengthen mechanisms of citizen participation and oversight over aid 
effectiveness architecture thereby ensure greater accountability from lead agencies 
involved in the development cooperation processes including government bureaucrats. 
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Introduction 
Despite contradictory views on whether development aid is beneficial to recipient 
economies, the international community has been increasingly concerned about developing 
strategies and policies of making aid more effective (Howes, 2011). It is in this spirit that 
successive international high-level forums on aid effectiveness have been held since the Paris 
Declaration (PD) in 2005. The main objective has mainly been to take stock of what has already 
been achieved and to seek ways of accelerating progress. Consequently, forums such as Accra in 
2008 and Busan in 2011 have since been held with a focus of reforming the aid architecture. In the 
more recent years, focus has shifted to “effective development cooperation” from “aid 
effectiveness” as demonstrated by the recent high-level meetings in Mexico City (2014) and 
Nairobi (2016).  
In this paper, the authors highlight the steps that have been taken by various players in 
pursuit of the PD agenda within the agriculture sector in Kenya. In particular, the study examines 
in detail the development aid architecture through focusing on mechanisms in place within the 
Kenyan government, mechanisms among and within donor agencies, and overall coordination 
mechanisms that bring together the donors and the government. 
Kenya’s agriculture sector typifies most other African countries where small-scale 
agricultural production is dominant. However, unlike many surrounding countries that have been 
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in political turmoil, Kenya has had a stable capitalist, pro-western orientation since independence 
in 1963. This has arguably made it possible for the country to maintain a long history of donor-
recipient relationship with leading western powers that according to Hornsby (2013) has ensured 
a continued flow of foreign aid thereby sustaining the economy over the years. Kenya’s stability 
(as opposed to specific policy actions) is probably a major factor for continued aid flow and the 
relatively better performance of aid in the country when compared to neighboring countries. The 
core of the PD is however beyond generalities of aid performance with concerns shifting to the 
quality of policy making processes within foreign aid relationships (Whitfield & Fraser, 2008).  
According to Howes (2011), efforts to improve aid effectiveness should focus on 
improving recipient government performance, productivity of donor agency performance and 
productivity of donor-recipient interaction. This three-tier conception of the structure of aid 
effectiveness strategies mirrors the specific mechanisms that have been instituted to implement 
PD in Kenya (herein referred to as aid effectiveness architecture). These mechanisms include: a) 
those that are meant to streamline actions within the Kenyan government, b) those that are intended 
for improving the quality of donor actions, and c) those that are meant to improve interactions 
between donors and Kenyan government. Some of the bodies that are currently in place include 
the aid effectiveness unit at the Treasury, the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy, the sector working 
groups, the Aid Effectiveness Group (formerly the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination 
Group), the Development Partners Coordination Group, the Development Partnership Group, and 
the Sector Working Groups (SWGs). Although there have been a number of studies undertaken to 
measure the progress of the implementation of PD in Kenya, none hitherto has specifically 
analyzed structures established to help implementation. Examples of such studies include a 2011 
report by OECD which highlighted the importance of cooperation between the government and 
her development partners stating that progress towards aid effectiveness relied on the level of input 
of both these entities. It nevertheless lacked analysis of the structures and the aid effectiveness 
architecture in place. Another report by New Partnership for African Development (Nepad, 2013) 
only discusses the status of implementation without going into the details of the success of each 
structure established.  
Qualitative methods were used in this study; mainly semi-structured interviews with 
officials of the Kenyan Treasury (External Budget Directorate), Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MALF) and officials of donor agencies. Others included policy analysts, NGO officials 
and officials of donor funded projects/programs. Most of these interviews were undertaken in 
Nairobi. Further information was gained through focus group discussions (FGD) with farmers in 
three Kenyan counties, namely Nakuru, Makueni and Kwale as well as examination of official 
government, donor and NGO documents. The paper is organized as follows: section two discusses 
the overall aid coordination mechanisms, followed by the aid effectiveness architecture within the 
Kenyan government in section three. In section four, the coordination and harmonisation efforts 
among donors are analyzed, and section five looks at the fate of the joint efforts between the donors 
and the government. Section 6 examines the Kenyan government leadership in the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The last section is the conclusion.  
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Gaps: Overall Aid Coordination 
Efforts to better coordinate aid in Kenya pre-date the 2005 Paris Declaration with the 
World Bank playing a critical role in convening the Kenya Consultative Meeting. Prior to 2003, 
these meetings were held in Paris (known as the “Paris Club”) and became a barometer for 
determining the relationship between Kenya and her donors. Most of that period was particularly 
tumultuous for the relationship between Kenya and her donors mainly because Kenya was deemed 
to have failed to comply with conditions for funding set by the World Bank and the IMF. The 
Consultative Group is particularly remembered for its ability to rally donors to force the Kenyan 
government to yield to reforms such as privatization and the introduction of multi-party politics. 
Of that period, O'brien and Ryan (2001) state:  
The influence of the donor community in Kenya was now so decisive that the 
Kenyan government not only succumbed and provided a detailed privatization 
plan at the November 1991 Donor Consultative Meeting held in Paris but most 
remarkably it grudgingly yielded to the establishment of the multi-party system. 
(p. 374)  
Although it became increasingly associated with the push for reforms, the Consultative 
Group was intended to provide the donors and the government an opportunity to consult on the 
country budget shortfalls and how the donors were to share this burden. Donors however took 
advantage of this to make it an opportunity to roundly assail the government on failures to 
implement prescriptive reforms and observance of human rights. In 1994 for example, the Group 
humiliated Kenya’s delegation led by a top Cabinet minister by refusing to give him audience, and 
rejected government request to resume aid. After 2003 however, changes have been noted. First, 
after a 7-year break, the Consultative Meetings were moved from Paris to Kenya’s capital city of 
Nairobi. This was in itself an indication that the donor attitude towards Kenya had changed because, 
by Kenya being the host, it was not unexpected that the visiting donor delegates would go soft in 
their desire to insist on stringent conditions in exchange for development resource support. The 
outcome was more than expected because in addition to this, Kenya’s status in the meeting 
improved so that at the 2003 Consultative Group meeting, the Kenyan government began to co-
chair the meeting alongside the World Bank.  
In the years that followed, the leading daily newspaper commentaries expressed these 
changes by noting that there was less complaisant rush within the government circles around the 
period of the Consultative Group meeting as compared with earlier years when officials would 
literally jostle to please the donors. The meeting’s structure was now designed in a way that 
portrayed some sense of dialogue between Kenya and the donors. It is in this environment that the 
donors pledged to rely more on government management and financing arrangements as well as 
increasing their aid efforts in the area of programme support that relies more on the country 
systems (World-Bank, 2005). This change was a reflection of the new policy adopted by OECD-
DAC during their high level meeting in Rome in 2003 where they agreed that Consultative 
Meetings shall be held in the recipient country and that the recipient country shall assume 
chairmanship and the setting of the agenda (OECD-DAC, 2003). In Kenya, these changes 
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conveniently coincided with the exit of a regime led by President Moi which had years of strained 
relations with donors. A new government was taking over that was made of a coalition of former 
opposition parties. Happening at such a time, it worked well as a sign of approval for the incoming 
government. Overall though, it also succeeded in dramatizing the changes because of the sudden 
manner in which the changes were introduced – e.g. moving the venue to Kenya and granting 
Kenya the privilege of co-chairing the meetings.  
More than ten years later, some remain doubtful and question the genuineness of donors 
giving the Kenyan government a freehand in deciding how to utilize development funds. Policy 
analysts interviewed argued that despite the rhetoric of change, donors remained imperious in the 
way they dealt with Kenya. Generally, it has been observed that donor statements tended to 
patronize the government, to focus on its shortcomings and in some cases to include underlying 
warnings of consequences if it (Kenya) did not take appropriate action on issues they (donors) 
raised. One media report for instance quoted donors threatening to withdraw aid in the 2005 
Consultative Group meeting because of perceived corruption (Mulama, 2005). With such ability 
to forge solidarity, it is possible to see how consultative group meetings can easily work more to 
the advantage of donors than to the interests of the Kenyan government. Unanimity among donors 
is possible because the donor representatives meet regularly and have ample opportunity to work 
out what would be convenient to their individual interests collectively. This solidarity did not 
transcend all matters as it seemed to work well when donors had joint issues to discuss with the 
government, but showed signs of mistrust between themselves in other circumstances. In 
confidential discussions, donor representatives mocked other agencies’ policies on specific 
grounds e.g. that there was too much fragmentation in their approach or that their intentions were 
questionable (for example seeking to ‘outshine others’). Although this kind of discourse was 
between officials of different agencies, it is also not lost on observers that the way donor agencies 
structured their programs depended on the domestic policies of their countries of origin. Their 
representatives therefore had little if any central role in making important decisions. At certain 
critical times, each donor directly negotiated with the Kenyan government the details of what they 
intended to undertake in a forum that other donors may not be party to. This negates the officially 
stated function of the Consultative Group meeting of ‘providing overall coordination’ (McCormick 
& Schmitz, 2011) because specific donor programs and projects did not come up for discussion. 
A consultative group meeting is therefore advantageous to donors; it gives them the 
solidarity and a common voice with which to face the Kenyan government (despite each of them 
having their own strategic interests).  Meanwhile, the Kenyan government position (if any) can 
easily be drowned as a lone voice in the middle of a coherent voice of the donors at these meetings. 
The net effect of this is the weakening of the ability of the Kenyan government to whip donors to 
its desired agenda while also foregoing benefits of full coordination among the donors as these 
same donors continue the pursuit of their own programs and projects. In line with these findings, 
it can be argued that donor solidarity at the Consultative meetings was counterproductive to the 
strengthening of Kenya’s ownership of its own development agenda.  
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The Development Partnership Forum (DPF) is another high level outfit, just a notch below 
the Consultative Group that meets twice every year for policy dialogue involving Kenyan 
government ministers (now cabinet secretaries) and Ambassadors (for bilateral agencies) and 
Country Representatives (for Multilateral Agencies). This level of engagement is intended to 
handle high level coordination issues and especially political issues. According to AES-Kenya 
(2016), the Development Partnership Forum is credited with pushing for the formation of 
Harmonization, Alignment and the coordination group (HAC) which was later named the Aid 
Effectiveness Group (AEG). It is this HAC and later AEG that has been the major force behind 
the practical aid effectiveness initiatives in Kenya including development of the Kenya Joint 
Assistance Strategy (KJAS) of 2007-2012, while it was still named HAC, that was intended to 
replace the individual donor strategies in Kenya (McCormick & Schmitz, 2011). Even after its 
expiry in 2012, most of the government officials and donor representatives interviewed in this 
study still made reference to KJAS as a document that guided donor and government engagement 
in a manner that suggested diminishing traction to the agenda of the Aid Effectiveness Principles.  
Operations at the DPF are not so different from the Consultative Group. Although the DPF 
brings together representatives of donors, the civil society and the government, the divide between 
donors on one end and the government on the other end remains visible. As is the case of the 
Consultative group meetings, donor representatives participate in the DPF having an already united 
position on issues they feel are important to their work in Kenya, and often point out issues for 
which the government should take steps to address but are not keen on confronting challenges in 
harmonization of their programs. For example, following the 6th Development Partnership Forum 
in 2013, a carefully worded joint statement was issued that, among other demands, called on the 
government to amend a proposed law viewed as limiting democratic space because this could  
restrict or even prevent the delivery of assistance in areas such as humanitarian 
aid, health, education, agriculture, implementation of the Constitution and other 
areas targeting marginalised groups (Development-Partners, 2013).  
Thus, through a strategy of identifying shortcomings in government, it can be argued that 
donors use their solidarity in the DPF deliberations as an opportunity to shift attention away from 
their own deficits in the implementation of the PD. The Kenyan government on its part is either 
uninterested or incapable of making stronger demands in this respect – at least from analysis of 
the proceedings at the forum.  Often, the objective of the speeches made from the government side 
appear to respond to the concerns raised by the donors, and lack clear demands on donors to fulfil 
their obligations to the PD. (For example, see a speech by the Deputy President at the 2013 DPF 
at http://www.deputypresident.go.ke).  
 
Aid Effectiveness Architecture within the Kenyan government 
The aid effectiveness secretariat was established in 2010 at Kenya’s National Treasury 
office within the External Resources Department. It is one of the most significant outfits within 
the government dealing directly with aid effectiveness issues. According to interviews with an 
official coordinating the unit, its existence came into being as a secretariat for the Harmonization, 
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Alignment and Coordination (HAC) group and continued to play this role when the HAC group 
changed its name to the Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG). Its role is indicated as that of coordinating 
implementation of Paris, Accra and Busan resolutions of the high level forum on aid effectiveness. 
Through interviews with this contact person, it was learned that the AES was a small unit within 
the External Resources Department run by two officers. As a secretariat for the AEG whose 
membership straddles the Kenyan government and the civil society and donors, the AES is 
expected to have strong links with these membership entities. Its establishment is described as 
“signalling a renewed partnership between the government of Kenya and her Development 
partners to make aid work better in Kenya” (AES-Kenya, 2016). It is therefore important in the 
planning and organization of various meetings on implementation of aid effectiveness principles 
that involve the government and its development partners.  
As currently constituted however and being part of the National Treasury, it is difficult to 
see the AES as a unit that is duly representative of the various players in the aid relationship, 
including the government, the development partners and the civil society. Its positioning makes it 
more of an appendage of a Kenyan government department, and therefore, one can anticipate how 
difficult it is for it to meaningfully drive the AEG agenda including tasks such as those achieved 
through the KJAS. Even as a purely government unit, the AES remains considerably weak in terms 
of its ability to network through the various government ministries and departments. None of the 
officials interviewed from the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, had knowledge of either its 
role or existence. In the design of the AES, provision was not made for mechanisms to extend its 
presence to all ministries and departments that implement donor supported programs. This aspect 
appears either neglected or found unnecessary, yet it would be useful if there was a sound 
information flow between the implementing agencies and the organization tasked with 
coordinating implementation of the PD. Ideally for any unit to operate optimally, it should have 
representative units within the various government departments that oversee activities that have a 
close relation to its mandate.  
During interviews, ministry officials were quick to point out other parallels of this nature 
that exist within government departments, and wondered why the same strategy had not been used 
in the design of the AES. Examples included the HIV/AIDS coordinating units and units in charge 
of gender established in most government ministries to help in mainstreaming these issues. One 
respondent particularly suggested that planning units existing in all ministries could have easily 
taken up the task of overseeing implementation of aid effectiveness principles as its additional role 
if it had been found necessary because the unit already oversees project planning and monitoring 
in various ministries. With the AES being unable to replicate itself at the level of ministries and 
departments, it was no surprise that government ministry officials hardly knew of its existence, let 
alone its supposed role.  
While the AES major concern would be to reinforce coordination of project and program 
implementation, doubts were expressed on capacity of the various departments to adequately 
handle the ownership concept because of the numerous units that exist within departments that are 
in themselves in dire need of coordination. For example, the Chief Finance Officers who control 
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disbursement of funds and the Departmental planners and economists have different chains of 
command. To complicate matters further, Project Coordinators of the various donor funded 
programs had their own centers of power and were also likely to be independent of the civil service 
– depending on the requirements of the donor. Therefore, even before embarking on harmonization 
of various entities involved in agriculture sector projects and programmes, there already existed 
internal challenges within the Ministries and government departments that were also in dire need 
of internal restructuring in order to enhance harmonization  
Weaknesses in aid effectiveness infrastructure within the Kenyan government are further 
evident in the organization of the Government Coordination Group (GCG). This is an entity whose 
role has been identified as that of coordinating aid effectiveness across different government 
ministries. According to AES-Kenya (2016), the GCG is made up of Permanent Secretaries (now 
Cabinet/Principal Secretaries) from ministries that are implementing externally funded 
development projects, and its establishment is to strengthen ownership and participation of 
government officials in dialogue with donors. Although its structure was agreed upon and a draft 
cabinet memo prepared in 2010, enquiries showed that the entity remained dormant and was yet 
to conduct any meaningful activities relating to its objectives. It was revealed that the Cabinet had 
not formally approved the group and so the planned monthly meetings were yet to take place as 
envisaged.  
Although some officials blamed transitional issues following the 2013 national elections 
and changes in constitution as reasons for the shortcomings observed in the aid effectiveness 
infrastructure within the government, this did not adequately explain the fact that there is not much 
enthusiasm in setting up the preliminary structures that would ensure that the GCG could run 
smoothly. Perhaps a more fundamental question was whether there existed any motivation for 
bureaucrats in government to put in place a working aid effective framework that cuts across 
ministries. For most government officials, attracting donor funding is an obvious priority. Since 
there is no connection between the ability to get donor funding and active participation in forums 
such as the GCG, it means that interest in the PD implementation is a lesser priority.  Indeed, donor 
support to each Ministry depended on the donors’ priorities and ability of the ministry officials to 
make a convincing case for support. It is probable that the idea of the GCG would have worked 
much better if it had a role in sanctioning how donor funds were to be distributed among different 
ministries and government departments.  
In summary, it is clear that support for an aid effectiveness infrastructure within the Kenyan 
government system has not received adequate enthusiasm and support. Establishment and the 
structuring of the AES, for example, does not appear to emanate from a strong internal drive to 
achieve particular policy objectives beyond its symbolic value of demonstrating the country’s 
commitment to the PD. Other initiatives such as the GCG have also failed to gain traction with 
ministry bureaucrats being more interested in attracting donor funded programs into their 
departments rather than seeking the PD compliance.  
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Coordination Efforts Among Donors 
The Development Partners Coordination Group (DCG) is the organ that overall brings 
together donors within Kenya. Representatives of about 19 donor agencies are actively involved 
in the DCG which began regular monthly meetings in 2004. From their regular meetings and ability 
to rally donors together in addressing issues of their concern, it has also been able to mobilize its 
equivalents at the sector level to handle sector-related issues. Consequently, in the general 
Agriculture Sector, the donors formed the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) Donor 
Group that meets on a monthly basis to deliberate donor concerns and aid coordination issues at 
the sector level. Interviews with some of the donor representatives showed that the ARD had a 
membership of about 17. All of them are part of the OECD/DAC group, although only ten meet 
regularly. Interviews also showed that through these meetings, the donor representatives have been 
able to share information about their activities, but they could sometimes use them as avenues for 
discovering opportunities for cooperation. 
In comparison to what goes on between government ministries and departments, donors 
certainly appeared better organized and keen to portray some level of commitment at harmonizing 
their activities as per the requirements of the Paris Declaration. Key informants credited the 
rotational three-member committee that runs the ARD as the key in providing leadership and 
driving its agenda. However, during an interview with the then Chairperson of the ARD, it was 
apparent that goodwill from the donors alone was insufficient to guarantee progress in the 
implementation of the PD even amongst donors themselves. That there were limits to the outcomes 
of donor deliberations and irrespective of how often they met, their actions were insufficient to 
replace the input of the Kenyan government and the true owners of the Agriculture Sector. 
Conceding that donors had their own preferences on programs and projects, the chairperson’s view 
was that the Kenyan government needed to weigh in strongly to provide guidance so that donor 
interests and other factors such as duplication and fragmentation of development efforts would not 
derail the country’s strategic objectives. Most ARD members were in agreement that the peer 
mechanisms within the ARD to self-regulate donor actions were insufficient because they lacked 
the legitimacy that was in the hands of the Kenyan government. In recognition of this challenge, 
the leadership of the ARD had been keen on establishing a forum that would brought together the 
donors and the government in which the government through the Ministry of Agriculture could 
assume the leadership role. Already, contact had been initiated with the Cabinet Secretary of the 
Ministry of Agriculture for this engagement to proceed. It however remained unclear how 
successful this initiative would be, given the dominant view that the initiation of the engagement 
processes should have begun with the “owners” (in this case the relevant ministry of the Kenyan 
government) and not the donors.  
There were undertones even amongst the donor representatives and expatriate community 
that strong ‘donor-only’ forums created an exclusive “club of donors” that alienated other 
stakeholders and networks necessary for achieving development objectives. Most of the 
government officials approached on this matter were in agreement observing that expatriates 
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working for donor agencies had created their own comfort zones that hindered enhanced 
interaction with local players in the interest of the sector. One officer’s comment was instructive: 
These donor experts are comfortable meeting on their own. I think that they 
consider themselves to have a superior view of the situation at hand or they 
just do not have value for discussions with us. 
In addition to exclusivity among donor agents, officers also mentioned that exclusive 
relationships also occur between donor agents and specific government or NGO officials who may 
act as ‘gate-keepers’ as per their privileged positions. This was thought to limit healthy interaction 
that could be helpful in achieving comprehensive solutions to issues at hand. Others saw this as 
emanating from the premium value that has become associated with the ability to develop a 
working relations with donor agents, where those who make it become protectionist. Nevertheless, 
it must also be appreciated that the level of interaction is sometimes dictated on a needs basis, and 
that donor agencies may often choose to reach out to specific senior officials because of their 
power and ability to make things “happen”.  
In summary however, other signals emanating from donor representatives (e.g. the U.S.) 
suggest that some donor agencies remain suspicious of the government systems which they see as 
not meeting their threshold on matters such as legitimacy, competency and corruption. Meanwhile, 
regular meetings between donor agents are likely to remain intact but with little benefit to 
improvement in coordination and harmonization of donor activities. In the absence of strong 
oversight, donors appear content that their regular meetings and sharing of information is adequate 
in meeting their PD requirements. 
 
Donors and Government: The Fate of Joint Efforts in Sector Coordination 
Joint effort at coordination between donors and government should remain a key ingredient 
for progress. The Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) was a significant milestone in this 
process because through it donors agreed to support Kenya’s Vision 2030 development strategy 
on the basis of the three pillars of encouraging economic growth, investing in people, and 
strengthening institutions while improving governance (HAC, 2007). Unfortunately, the original 
KJAS was revised in 2009 and was meant to expire by 2012, and traction towards revision appears 
to have lost steam. For example, although a post Busan report on Kenya makes mention of the 
KJAS indicating that efforts were underway to revise it, nothing substantive has since come out. 
At the sector level, efforts by the government ministries and donors at developing a coordination 
framework to ease design and implementation of development programs are yet to make any 
substantive progress.  
Formation of the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) in 2005 was one of the 
most significant efforts towards sector coordination in agriculture. Its establishment was part of 
the resolutions contained in the Strategy for the Revitalization of Agriculture (SRA) which sought 
for a coordinated approach between the government, donors and the private sector in the running 
of the Agriculture Sector (Poulton & Kanyinga, 2014). Although the idea of the ASCU was loaded 
with the greatest of intentions, by 2014, the unit was simply not as active and as strong an 
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organization as had been purposed, and by 2015 it no longer existed. In an interview, one expert 
who was privy to the ASCU activities observed that the convening of the ICC had become difficult 
because the Permanent Secretaries were all too busy carrying out their individual mandates, and 
there was generally little time to convene as a group. Although a revolving chairmanship had been 
proposed initially, this was not implemented and therefore ownership issues of the ASCU 
processes cropped up as a challenge. Interviews, especially with officials of the Ministry affirmed 
that the ASCU itself was not well grounded within the government system and its existence relied 
greatly on the goodwill of a few top ministry officials and the generosity and pressure from 
development partners. Within the top ministry hierarchy, it was widely accepted that the ASCU 
was a donor driven organization that lacked legitimacy within the government and that its 
functions were in competition with other legitimately established organs of the Ministry. 
Contrariwise, the DAC sector aligned donors remained the greatest supporters of the ASCU, and 
this support extended even by donors known not to be enthusiastic of government led processes.  
Being reliant on donors, the ASCU on its part seemed unable to push donors to comply 
with the commitments they made on the aid effectiveness front. Similarly, since it did not have a 
strong grounding within government, it would have been ambitious to have great expectations on 
the  ASCU’s ability to steer the government into good outcomes on the Paris Declaration. Apart 
from the murmurs within the Ministry of Agriculture, the actions of the central government also 
demonstrated the ASCU’s shaky position. In one example, the central government ignored a 
planning framework known as the Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP) that had been developed 
jointly between the Ministry and donors through the ASCU. Instead, it went ahead and 
commissioned its own framework. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was 
officially utilized by the government as a planning framework for the agriculture sector strategy. 
The outcome of this was a level of confusion and dismay particularly amongst the donors in the 
Agriculture Sector who agonized on whether it was worthwhile for them to continue using the 
MTIP as a guide for their support for the sector after the government had pulled out of it.  
Apart from the challenge of competing sector definitions, another issue that came up during 
field work for this study was what was observed as the formation of multiple donor groups with 
sector related objectives. The original Agriculture and Rural Development Group (ARD) driven 
through the KJAS considered itself the donor group in charge of the Productive Sector and pursued 
issues on agricultural value chain development while working closely with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Cooperative Development. However, 
another donor group had recently been established and known as the “Private Sector and Trade” 
group mobilized through the Ministry of Industrialization. Participation in the new donor group 
was similar in terms of agencies represented (each agency possibly sending a different person to 
represent them). At the time of this research, the new donor group had identified seven (7) value 
chains to work on, all closely mirroring the ARD’s activities and amounting to possible duplication 
of efforts. Another loose group of donors (led by the Swedish) focused on implementation of the 
Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), a sector-wide program based at the Ministry of 
Agriculture and initiated through the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU).   
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In retrospect, the ASCU’s legitimacy problems can be traced to the occasions when the 
government is seen as undermining some of the ASCU-led processes. The dilemma being that the 
ASCU is supposedly an established government agency yet the reality has been that its legitimacy 
is not immune to intrigues within the government, formal or informal. Sector experts I interviewed 
pointed out that the ASCU also suffered from the inability of its constituent organs to function 
fully and provide the expected direction for the sector. Some of the failures related to the 
practicability of the said organs – for example, some argued that it was difficult to expect 
Permanent Secretaries in charge of the different ministries to meet frequently as an ICC when each 
of them had a full plate in terms of individual responsibilities for their ministries. Another 
argument was that not all ministries had equal interest in all the issues in the domain of the ASCU 
and therefore it was unrealistic to expect consistent participation and a general sense of being in 
the core of the ASCU agenda. Consequently, it was said that only the three ministries of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperatives found the need to meet more often. Other issues bordered 
on supremacy wars between personalities in the different ministries exacerbated by the fact that 
the ASCU was hosted by one of the ministries and therefore seen as an appendage of that ministry. 
Matters were made no less difficult by a perception that the ASCU’s existence seemed to rely on 
specific personalities’ incumbency in top government offices. The 2013 change in government 
was, for example, said to have been particularly unfavorable to the ASCU’s promoters in the civil 
service. What followed was an open hostility between the ASCU and the Ministry of Agriculture 
leading to the arrest of top ASCU officials who subsequently sought a court intervention and a 
judicial review (Kenya-Law, 2014; Musa, 2014). By 2016, the only vestiges of the ASCU that are 
still visible are their former offices and a modern boardroom bearing its name at the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Kilimo House in Nairobi. 
In light of these findings, it is pertinent that some level of uncertainty still bedevils the joint 
efforts between the government and donors. The demise of the ASCU is quite informative in this 
case as it was originally intended to facilitate coordination of the various players in the sector 
including donors and the government. With the agriculture functions now devolved, coordination 
of sector activities will be further complicated as there may be need for each of the counties to 
have their own frameworks through which they can deal with donors operating in their respective 
counties. Given the difficulties observed with the ASCU and national level coordination, it is safe 
to predict that it will take a while before any semblance of a workable framework is achieved at 
the county level. 
 
Effectiveness Structures: A Focus on the Kenyan Government Leadership Role 
From observations, the Kenyan government-led aid effectiveness institutions and forums 
are much weaker and less active when compared to those established by donors. These weaknesses 
are laid bare through failures to convene frequently, lack of clear agenda and the fact that most of 
them do not exist beyond the Ministry of Finance as reported by Nepad (2013). For example, 
although the Ministry of Agriculture implements numerous donor-funded programs, the aid 
effectiveness unit at the Treasury is yet to extend its presence to the Ministry. Without a strong 
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link, it is hard for the unit to influence decisions at the Ministry where officials often engage 
directly with donors for possible collaboration. Farmers and other beneficiaries are further 
removed for them to have any sort of awareness of their existence and implementation.  
With the concept of ownership vesting greater power on recipients on matters of 
prioritizing donor fund utilization, it would be expected that recipient governments seize the 
opportunity and lead the processes of establishing the necessary structures for rapid 
implementation – especially so considering that aid in the past was based on donors dictating 
conditions. In this case however, the weak arrangements in place signal a lack of a strong internal 
drive from top officials to make PD implementation a priority. The inability for action to 
seamlessly permeate into every government department implementing donor funded programs or 
projects implies that the structures put in place retain their mechanistic nature as derived from the 
international system that drives the aid effectiveness policies. This is problematic as success in 
diffusion of international policies have often been associated with processes of interpretation and 
gradual adjustment to suit the local context (Stone, 2012). Consequently, the structures in place 
lack reflective learning or normative mimicry, a situation that has been associated with 
dysfunctional policy transfer (Sharman, 2010). Hence, Kenyan authorities within the Agriculture 
Sector do not exhibit the assertiveness that is expected of a country in a middle income bracket. 
Analysis of Kenya government officials’ speeches during the PD related functions led to similar 
conclusions – Kenya was not providing strong leadership on its development agenda during her 
engagement with development partners. This view was consistent with what has been expressed 
elsewhere (ROA, 2014, p. 63). This state of affairs is in contrast with some other African countries 
including Botswana, Ethiopia and Rwanda that have been said to exhibit greater control over aid 
negotiations (Whitfield & Fraser, 2008). 
In this particular case, it may be necessary to consider the impact of the historical factors 
associated with the agriculture sector in relation to Kenya’s development partners. Unlike other 
sectors that are attracting newer donors, the Agriculture Sector remains dominated by traditional 
OECD-DAC donors. The significance of this is that the baggage of the previous donor 
conditionality relationship may be a cause for continued unequal relationship in aid negotiations. 
Second, the whole idea of the PD in itself presents a dilemma of sorts for those who have 
experience in “negotiating” for projects with donors. Generally, there is a perception among 
government officials that they (government officials) and the donor agents naturally hold opposing 
views, and that success in aid negotiation is only possible if one is able to tune their ideas to fit in 
with what the donors require. This is a perception that recognized the primacy of donors and the 
need to approach them carefully and skillfully as being the necessary bear minimum. By being at 
the forefront of the PD which champions recipient ownership (‘recipient-like’ views as opposed 
to ‘donor-like views), the donors ‘steal the show’ and complicate the available options for 
government officials in terms of what body of ideas they are entitled to as agents for the recipient 
of aid at the negotiating table.  
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Conclusion 
Analysis of the performance of the various organs established to implement PD in Kenya’s 
agriculture sector reveals a major weakness in the aid effectiveness infrastructure. Donors seem 
enthusiastic to show that they are “walking the talk” through the establishment of active donor 
forums. However, as demonstrated in this paper, these forums have been more successful as 
opportunities for donors to “talk at each other” rather than to dialogue and develop a unified 
working relationship with the government officials. In other words, the forums have become an 
“exclusive club” where the members retreat into the comfort of other expatriates. Consequently, 
regular interaction between donors is yet to yield such things as a division of labor protocol, joint 
programming or resolutions to compel all donors to channel their aid through the country system. 
There is therefore some level of inaction that is inconsistent with the public image that the donor 
agencies project. For this reason, I argue that donors who are themselves responsible for the 
establishment of the PD are under pressure to show their commitment to it for political reasons. In 
doing this however, they are confronted by other competing interests and factors. One is the 
strategic interests that have previously been described as motivating donors to give aid (Gounder, 
1994; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998; Younas, 2008; Youngs, 
2004). Although donors in this particular study did not admit openly that their aid had strategic 
objectives, these could be gleaned from some of their policies and actions. For example, most 
donors chose to fund specific sub-sectors and not others. They were also more concerned about 
success being attributed to their actions rather than the overall output of aid. For this reason, joint 
programming has been resisted with donors shying off from e.g. the ASDSP, which was seen as 
being dominated by Sweden.  
In addition to strategic interests, a number of donors in the agriculture sector in Kenya are 
wary of channeling their aid through the established government system, and instead choose their 
own ways of implementing projects and programs. Although again the reasons for these were not 
explicit, some of the donor representatives mentioned corruption among other system failures as 
deterrents to fully trusting the government system. For donors to adopt “conditionality-like” 
policies in an era of the PD appears as a contradiction of sorts because the cardinal principle of the 
PD is recognition of the self-determination of recipient countries led by democratic regimes. 
However, with the increasing importance that donors are attaching to the political economy 
analysis of recipient countries (OECD-DAC, 2005; Scott, 2007), these analytical reports seem to 
gain ground as instruments to validate donors’ disinterest to fully implement aid effectiveness 
principles. 
On the Kenyan government side, the aid effectiveness mechanisms in place have a different 
kind of weakness. They have failed to permeate through the various departments involved with 
donor programs, and as a result, knowledge about them is not widespread. Their presence is limited 
to the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) and their operations are less visible in comparison to related 
activities among donor agents within the country. This researcher suggests that this failure has 
come to be because of a lack of interest and motivation within Kenyan authorities to internalize 
the PD concepts and domesticate them through a process of interpretation. Internally, this cascades 
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to either insufficient demand to push these processes forward or existence of other competing 
interests. 
Another perspective to this is external where analysis points to the weakness as emerging 
from the fact that the PD processes rely on domineering strategic ideas proposed by its originators, 
that is, the donors who are also known to be the drivers of modern hegemonic ideas. Although the 
concepts themselves are shaped to present the government as an equal partner, i.e. the recipient 
and “owner” of the funded development initiative, donors are able to utilize soft forms of coercion 
among other covert strategies (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007) to limit independent initiatives 
that could enrich a government’s own PD initiatives.  
Lastly, challenges to diffusion of aid effectiveness principles into Kenya’s agriculture 
sector can also be analyzed on the basis of the incentives/sanctions or normative pressure that 
many authors have argued as driving compliance (Checkel, 2014; Kelley & Simmons, 2013). 
Incentives for the PD implementation have mainly relied on the international forums that drive the 
aid effectiveness/effective development cooperation agenda. This form of incentive that is 
externally driven is insufficient to generate adequate action especially from the Kenyan 
government. The researcher therefore argues for the need to strengthen mechanisms of citizen 
participation and oversight over aid effectiveness architecture thereby ensuring greater 
accountability from lead agencies involved in the development cooperation processes including 
government bureaucrats. Relying on the engagement forums between Kenyan government and 
sector donors on their own is not adequate to induce compliance. With the ongoing devolution of 
agriculture functions in Kenya, it is expected that important development cooperation relationships 
will now be situated at the county level unlike in the past where these were highly centralized. The 
new aid architecture structures will be better placed if they adopt better accountability 
mechanisms.   
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